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Unchecked: How Frazier v. CitiFinancial Eliminated
Judicially Created Grounds for Vacatur Under the Federal
Arbitration Act*
I. Introduction
Arbitration agreements play a pivotal role in resolving civil disputes. In an
effort to avoid the time and expense of litigation, arbitration is often favored
over traditional judicial remedies.1 In 1925, Congress passed the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) to provide a mechanism for arbitration award
enforcement and to end an era of judicial hostility toward arbitration.2 Under
the FAA, a party may have an arbitration award converted into a court order
by a federal court through a confirmation process.3 When a federal court is
asked to confirm an arbitration award, the FAA provides for a deferential
review of the award and outlines specific statutory grounds for vacating the
award.4 However, in many situations, the narrow statutory grounds for
vacatur fail to remedy unjust arbitration awards.5 These situations highlight
the tension between deference to arbitration awards and promotion of justice
in the enforcement of contracts. To ease this tension, courts have developed
common-law grounds for vacating arbitration awards.6 While judicially
created grounds for vacatur have not been used extensively, they have
frequently acted as a safety valve for situations in which the interests of
justice demanded vacatur of an arbitration award.
In Hall Street v. Mattel, the Supreme Court recently questioned the
validity and role of judicially-created grounds for vacatur but did not

* The author dedicates this note to Erin. The author also wishes to thank University of
Oklahoma College of Law Associate Dean Emily H. Meazell, Professor Steven Gensler, and
Professor Elizabeth Bangs for their advice, support, and encouragement during the writing of
this note.
1. Di Jiang-Schuerger, Perfect Arbitration = Arbitration + Litigation?, 4 HARV. NEGOT.
L. REV. 231, 231 (1999).
2. See id. at 245.
3. 9 U.S.C § 9 (2006).
4. Id. § 10(a); Jiang-Schuerger, supra note 1, at 232.
5. See, e.g., Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998); Montes v.
Shearson Lehman Bros., 128 F.3d 1456 (11th Cir. 1997).
6. See Hoeft v. MVL Grp., Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2003); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl,
The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration
Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420 (2008) (exploring the contradictions in arbitration law and the
non-statutory grounds for vacatur which have been created since the passage of the Federal
Arbitration Act).
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ultimately resolve the question.7 Hall Street’s ambiguity has fueled ongoing
disagreements among courts as to the extent of the judiciary’s authority to
vacate awards under the FAA.8 One interpretation of Hall Street, which
would significantly alter current legal norms, permits courts to vacate
arbitration awards only when statutory grounds for vacatur are satisfied.9
Other courts accept expansively interpret § 10(a)(4) of the FAA to include
judicially-created grounds for vacatur.10 As a result, circuit courts are split as
to the viability and application of non-statutory grounds for vacatur under the
FAA.
The 2010 Eleventh Circuit decision in Frazier v. CitiFinancial illustrates
the error of the former interpretation of Hall Street and illuminates the
dangers of such changes in the law.11 The Frazier court interpreted Hall
Street to mean that “§§ 9-11 represent the exclusive grounds for vacatur
under the FAA.”12 Although the Eleventh Circuit asserted that it was
following relevant precedent, it improperly construed the scope of Hall Street
and, in so doing, eliminated a valuable safeguard to the integrity of the
arbitration system: judicially-created grounds for vacatur. Further, the
Frazier court’s use of unsubstantiated policy justifications in support of the
decision highlights judicial misconceptions regarding both the effect of nonstatutory grounds for vacatur on judicial efficiency and the existence of a
national policy favoring arbitration. This decision, intended to simplify the
application of the FAA, ultimately leaves parties in the Eleventh Circuit at
the unbridled mercy of sometimes arbitrary arbitrators.
This note analyzes the Frazier decision in four parts. Part II provides a
review of the law surrounding the FAA, including the Hall Street decision.
Part III discusses the facts, issue, rationale, and decision in Frazier. Part IV
conducts an in-depth analysis of the Frazier decision by (1) outlining the
importance of judicially created grounds for vacatur to public confidence in
7. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 579 (2008).
8. Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2010).
9. E.g., Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 350, 355 (5th Cir. 2009)
(“We conclude that Hall Street restricts the grounds for vacatur to those set forth in § 10 of the
[FAA], and consequently, manifest disregard of the law is no longer an independent ground for
vacating arbitration awards under the FAA.”).
10. See, e.g., Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assoc., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir.
2009) (“We have already determined that the manifest disregard ground for vacatur is
shorthand for a statutory ground under the FAA, specifically 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4), which states
that the court may vacate where the arbitrators exceeded their powers.”) (internal citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
11. 604 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2010).
12. Id. at 1324 (emphasis added).
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the arbitration system and highlighting the need for judicially created grounds
for vacatur as a public policy check on the arbitration system; (2) explaining
how congressional intent is best served by the preservation of judicially
created grounds for vacatur; (3) demonstrating how contract law can be used
to support the utility of judicially created grounds for vacatur; (4) analyzing
the narrow scope of the Hall Street holding; and (5) critiquing the notion that
there is a substantive national policy favoring arbitration. Part V concludes
this note by arguing that judicially created grounds for vacatur should be
preserved because they are critical to maintaining the vitality of the
arbitration system.
II. The Law Preceding the Case
Congress enacted the FAA during a time when the judicial branch
consistently refused to enforce arbitration awards.13 Courts perceived
arbitration as a form of judicial outsourcing that could lead to unjust results.14
In an attempt to eliminate judicial hostility toward arbitration awards,
Congress enacted the FAA as a clear mandate requiring courts to enforce
arbitration agreements but included several very narrow statutory grounds for
vacatur.15 While these statutory grounds for vacatur addressed the most
obvious procedural concerns, they did not apply to mistakes of fact or law.16
To make matters worse, courts initially interpreting the FAA created
common-law rules discouraging vacatur and requiring that courts make all
inferences necessary to confirm arbitration awards.17 Consequently, an
inflexible system of judicial review emerged that left judges helpless to
correct awards based on errors of fact or law. Over time, however, the
sensitive nature of labor dispute arbitration led to a less deferential review of
arbitration awards and the creation of non-statutory grounds for vacatur as
mechanisms for vacating unjust arbitration awards.18 This section outlines

13. See Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Judicial Enforcement of Predispute
Arbitration Agreements: Back to the Future, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 249, 263 (2003)
(explaining the sense of early courts that all citizens should have the right to a full adjudication
and the ability to withdraw from arbitration and enter litigation at will prior to the FAA).
14. See id.
15. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
16. Id. § 10.
17. See Firemen’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Flint Hosiery Mills, Inc., 74 F.2d 533, 536 (4th Cir.
1935); Fine v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 765 F. Supp. 824, 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
18. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596-97
(1960); W. Elec. Co. v. Commc’n Equip. Workers, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 161, 167 (D. Md. 1976).
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the evolution of the FAA and judicial interpretation thereof, starting with the
FAA’s enactment and concluding with the current state of the law.
A. Federal Arbitration Act of 1925
1. History and Congressional Intent
Congress adopted the FAA in response to a long period of judicial
resistance to enforcing arbitration agreements.19 The FAA sent a clear
message to the judicial branch that judicial hostility toward arbitration must
end.20 Congress passed the FAA to “reduc[e] [the] technicality, delay and
expense to a minimum and at the same time safeguard[] the rights of the
parties.”21 At the time, a large portion of the support for the FAA came from
trade associations wishing to limit their litigation expenses.22 The parties
believed arbitration was more predictable and efficient.23 Until the enactment
of the FAA, courts had allowed either party to avoid arbitration with relative
ease.24 Parties could avoid arbitration at any time simply by moving the
dispute into formal litigation.25 Thus, Congress enacted the FAA to further
validate arbitration agreements by denying a party the ability to unilaterally
disregard the arbitration agreement in favor of formal litigation.26
19. THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION IN A NUTSHELL 55 (2007).
20. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16; see Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 1998)
(“It has been made clear by the Supreme Court, this court and other courts that the ancient
judicial hostility to arbitration is a thing of the past.”).
21. Stanley A. Leasure, Arbitration After Hall Street v. Mattel: What Happens Next, 31 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 273, 274 (2009) (alterations in original) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 6896, at 2 (1924)).
22. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Coklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 409 n.2 (1967) (Black,
J., dissenting) (“The principal support for the Act came from trade associations dealing in
groceries and other perishables and from commercial and mercantile groups in the major
trading centers.”).
23. See Cheryl Aptowitzer, Note, Arbitration – Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards –
Courts May Review and Vacate an Arbitration Award Where an Arbitrator Commits Gross,
Unmistakable, or Not Reasonably Debatable Errors of Law or Where the Arbitrator Manifestly
Disregards the Law and the Result is Unjust – Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc.,
129 N.J. 479, 610 A.2d 364 (1992), 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 998, 998-1000 (1993).
24. Richard E. Speidel, Arbitration of Statutory Rights under the Federal Arbitration Act:
The Case for Reform, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 157, 169 n.46 (1989) (citing Paul L. Sayre,
Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L. J. 595 (1928)) (explaining that
before the enactment of the FAA, courts commonly abided by the “ouster” doctrine: “The
effect of the ‘ouster’ doctrine was that a party who had agreed to arbitrate a future dispute
could withdraw without an effective sanction anytime before the final award.”).
25. Id.
26. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
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Congress not only sought to provide a more efficient method for dispute
resolution but also hoped to promote freedom of contract. The FAA codifies
the freedom of private parties to reach enforceable agreements representing
the parties’ consensual will.27 Parties often view arbitration as a less
burdensome and more predictable means of dispute resolution.28 A core
value of arbitration is that parties are the owners of their disputes and should
be able to direct the resolution as they see fit.29 This explains why courts
have consistently relied on the principle of contractual freedom to justify
judicial deference to arbitration awards.
The FAA provides a framework that allows for enforcement of arbitration
awards. Many courts and commentators believe the provisions “establish a
strong national policy in favor of arbitration.”30 Others, however, argue that
the text of the FAA—read in combination with the congressional intent—
simply elevates arbitration agreements to the same level as other contracts.31
Indeed, many courts have found no national policy favoring arbitration in the
FAA.32 As discussed below, the debate over whether there is a national
policy favoring arbitration proves crucial to understanding the Frazier court’s
holding.33
2. The Framework Established by the FAA for Arbitration Enforcement
The FAA is divided into three chapters, with the first sixteen sections
compiled in the first chapter.34 For purposes of this note, the most relevant
sections are §§ 9 and 10.35 Section 9 provides that within a year of the
27. David K. Kessler, Why Arbitrate? The Questionable Quest for Efficiency in
Arbitration After Hall Street Associates, 8 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 77, 82-83 (2009).
28. Id.
29. EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 4-5
(2006); see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995) (exploring the
notion that each individual dispute has characteristics that make it suitable for a particular
method of resolution, including arbitration or litigation, which should ultimately be decided by
the parties involved in the dispute).
30. Maureen A. Weston, The Other Avenues of Hall Street and Prospects for Judicial
Review of Arbitral Awards, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 929, 933 (2010).
31. See Arthur Andersen, LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1901 (2009).
32. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476
(1989); Gotham Holdings, LP v. Health Grades, Inc., 580 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 2009); see
also Arthur Andersen, LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009).
33. Infra Part IV.D.2.
34. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
35. The other sections pertain to maritime transactions, validity of the arbitration
agreement, the procedure for compelling arbitration under a valid agreement, the appointment
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issuance of an arbitration award it may be confirmed by a district court.36
Thus, the arbitration award transforms into a court-ordered judgment.37 The
court may refuse to confirm an arbitration award, however, if one of four
specifically defined grounds for vacatur in § 10 of the FAA exists.38
The first statutory ground for vacating an arbitration award provides for
vacatur “where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means.”39 The next enumerated ground allows a court to vacate an award
where the arbitrator is biased in favor of a party or corrupt.40 These two
grounds police outright defects in the arbitration process, such as bribes,
various forms of intimidation, and threats of violence.41 The drafters of the
FAA appeared to be heavily concerned that corruption could ultimately
undermine the legitimacy of arbitration awards.
The third provision providing for vacatur of an arbitration award addresses
procedural and evidentiary concerns.42 A district court may vacate a
judgment if arbitrators “refus[ed] to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient
cause shown” or “refus[ed] to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy.”43 Moreover, the FAA includes a clause designed to thwart
other procedural defects: when “misbehavior by which the rights of any party
have been prejudiced [occurs],” vacatur is proper.44 Arbitrators are not held
to the same procedural standards that apply in judicial proceedings; a court
simply reviews the arbitration for violations of minimal fairness safeguards.45
On balance, parties in judicial proceedings enjoy far better protections than
parties in arbitration. 46
The fourth ground for vacatur under § 10 of the FAA proves to be the
most important because many courts have interpreted it to include judiciallycreated grounds for vacatur. Section 10(a)(4) provides for vacatur “[w]here
of arbitrators, fees, compelling attendance, and other procedures under the FAA.
36. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (“[A]t any time within one year after the award is made any party to the
arbitration may apply to the court so specified for an order confirming the award, and
thereupon the court must grant such an order . . . .”).
37. Id.
38. Id. § 10.
39. Id. § 10(a)(1).
40. Id. § 10(a)(2) (providing for vacatur “where there was evident partiality or corruption
in the arbitrators...”).
41. CARBONNEAU, supra note 19, at 78.
42. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. CARBONNEAU, supra note 19, at 78.
46. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
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the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.”47 Courts have often applied this ground where arbitrators ruled on
matters not submitted to arbitration.48 Section 10(a)(4) has also applied in
cases where an arbitrator has not provided a ruling to the parties that would
be helpful in resolving the dispute.49 As discussed later, the ambiguous
language of § 10(a)(4), which allows courts to interpret it to include judicially
created grounds for vacatur, is pivotal to the protection of judicially created
grounds for vacatur in many jurisdictions.
Judicial interpretation of the four statutory grounds for vacatur has
significantly limited when unjust arbitration awards may be vacated pursuant
to the FAA. In order to preserve the integrity of arbitration awards and avoid
re-litigating disputes, courts have consistently limited the statutory grounds
for vacatur. As a result, judicially crafted rules give great deference to
arbitration awards, even when the awards are based on inaccurate facts or
inapplicable legal authority.
In-depth reviews by courts, while outside of the review permitted by the
FAA, appeared to receive the Supreme Court’s endorsement in Wilko v.
Swan.50 In Wilko, the Court announced the first judicially-created ground for
vacatur: manifest disregard for the law.51 The Wilko Court explained that
“the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest
disregard [of the law] are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review
for error in interpretation.”52 The Court reasoned if an arbitrator is simply
interpreting the law, then the arbitration award should not be vacated.53
However, where an arbitrator completely disregards the law on which the
award should be based, courts have the power to vacate the arbitration
award.54 The Wilko decision could have signaled a significant reduction in
judicial deference to unjust arbitration awards. But despite Wilko’s apparent
recognition of/endorsement of common-law grounds for vacatur, courts
largely continued to strictly construe the statutory grounds.

47. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).
48. CARBONNEAU, supra note 19, at 78.
49. Id.
50. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
51. See, e.g., O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Prof’l Planning Assocs., 857 F.2d 742, 746 (11th Cir.
1988) (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)).
52. 346 U.S. at 436-37.
53. See, e.g., O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Prof’l Planning Assocs., 857 F.2d 742, 746 (11th Cir.
1988) (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)).
54. Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 496, 501 (M.D. Fla. 1992).
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B. Limited Application of Statutory Grounds for Vacatur Under the FAA
Hoping to preserve the finality of arbitration awards and fearing that an
expansive review might permit frivolous attempts by losing parties to have
awards set aside,55 courts have narrowly applied the statutory grounds for
vacatur.56 Consistent with long-standing deference to arbitration awards,
courts voluntarily narrowed the scope of judicial review of arbitration
awards.57 The Supreme Court went so far as to conclude that parties who
contracted into arbitration agreements were “willing to accept less
certainty.”58 Thus, courts interpreted the FAA’s statutory grounds for vacatur
very narrowly—even creating judicial rules reflective of this interpretation.
In order to promote finality, courts created rules advancing a deferential
approach to judicial review of arbitration awards. In Fine v. Bear, Stearns &
Co., the Southern District of New York concluded that “[i]t is well-settled
that a court’s power to vacate an arbitration award must be extremely limited
because an overly expansive judicial review of arbitration awards would
undermine the litigation efficiencies which arbitration seeks to achieve.”59
Likewise in Firemen’s Fund Insurance Co. v. Flint Hosiery Mills, the Fourth
Circuit noted that, in order to avoid substituting its judgment for the judgment
of the arbitrator, a court should utilize every reasonable presumption in favor
of upholding the outcome of the arbitration.60 In short, the courts constructed
rules that made it incredibly difficult for parties to vacate arbitration awards
under the statutory provisions of the FAA, even where the result was unjust.
Extreme deference to arbitration awards routinely prompted courts to
confirm awards even when the arbitrator applied incorrect law or made
clearly erroneous findings of fact. Courts concluded that even a clear mistake
of law or fact is not sufficient to disturb an arbitration award.61 As a general
policy, “non-reviewability [of the application of the facts to the law] remains
the general rule . . . and exceptions are few and far between.”62 Thus, judicial
55. E.g., Gramling v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 151 F. Supp. 853, 860-61 (W.D.S.C.
1957).
56. Id. at 206.
57. See Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 345 (1854).
58. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953).
59. Fine v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 765 F. Supp. 824, 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
60. 74 F.2d 533, 536 (4th Cir. 1935) (“It is well established that every reasonable
presumption will be indulged to sustain an award . . . .”).
61. Salt Lake Pressmen & Platemakers, Local Union No. 28 v. Newspaper Agency Corp.,
485 F. Supp. 511, 515 (D. Utah 1980); see Wash.-Balt. Newspaper Guild, Local 35 v. Wash.
Post Co., 442 F.2d 1234, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
62. Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing Bettencourt v. Bos.
Edison Co., 560 F.2d 1045, 1049 (1st Cir. 1977)).
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interpretations of the FAA not only supported the finality of arbitration
awards, but also preserved Congressional intent to provide a highly
deferential review.63 Nevertheless, courts occasionally found arbitration
awards so erroneous that they refused to confirm them. The courts’ refusal to
confirm unjust arbitration awards led to the emergence of judicially created
grounds for vacatur.
C. The Emergence of Judicially Created Grounds for Vacatur
Judicially created grounds for vacatur originated in the context of labor
dispute arbitration between union workers and employers. Eight years after
Wilko, the sensitive nature of these disputes prompted the Supreme Court to
announce a less deferential review of labor arbitration awards.64 In
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corporation, the Supreme Court
expressed concerns that arbitrators may deviate from collective bargaining
agreements and “dispense [their] own brand of industrial justice.”65 The
Steelworkers Court reasoned that an arbitration “award is legitimate only so
long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.”66 As
the “essence test” gained momentum, courts explored its exact parameters.
In clarifying the “essence test,” courts took language from Steelworkers and
expanded upon it—attempting to craft a more specific and workable standard
of review.67 As a result, courts started stepping away from the bright-line
rule that arbitration awards would not be vacated because of mistakes of fact
or law. Instead, courts began to certify arbitration awards unless they lacked
any basis in fact or law or the award was not within the essence of the
contract.68 The “essence test” became the first step toward judicially created
grounds for vacatur.69

63. Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Crumbled Difference Between Legal and Illegal
Arbitration Awards: Hall Street Associates and the Waning Public Policy Exception, 14
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 597, 605-06 (2009).
64. CARBONNEAU, supra note 19, at 202.
65. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
66. Id.
67. W. Elec. Co. v. Commc’n Equip. Workers, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 161, 167 (D. Md. 1976)
(noting that the “‘essence’ test lack[ed] sufficient specificity to provide lower courts with a
consistent and workable standard in exercising their function of review”) (quoting Local 1852
Waterfront Guard Ass’n v. Amstar Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1026, 1031 (D. Md. 1973)).
68. Id. at 169 (emphasis omitted) (announcing a new test which would support an
arbitration agreement “unless it lacks any facts to support it or unless it is not within the
essence of the contract”).
69. Id.
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In the 1970s, courts vigilantly attempted to ensure the merit of arbitration
awards, which resulted a less deferential standard of review for arbitration
awards.70 In Timken Co. v. Local Union No. 1123, United Steelworkers of
America, the employer sought to vacate an award in favor of an employee
who was terminated after incarceration prevented him from attending work.71
The arbitrator concluded that the employee should be reinstated on the basis
of impermissible discrimination: explaining that because the employer freely
granted leave in cases of illness or injury, an employee serving jail time
should also be granted leave.72 Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit vacated the
arbitration award.73 It maintained that when arbitrators go “beyond th[e]
testimony and the record” to reach a conclusion, arbitration awards lack the
force of law.74
Steelworkers and Timken illustrate a move toward judicial review of the
merits of arbitration awards. This approach was diametrically opposed to the
long-standing deference given to arbitration agreements by the federal court
system. After Steelworkers, even where courts recited standards that
recognized extreme deference to the arbitration awards, they often conducted
a detailed analysis of the arbitrators’ reasoning and of the results.75 For
example, in Western Electric Co. v. Communication Equipment Workers,
Inc., the federal district court in Maryland purported to undertake a highly
deferential review.76 Yet the court reviewed the arbitrator’s decision with
regard to each issue and scrutinized the reasoning behind the results.77 This
type of merits-based review of the facts and circumstances underlying an
award exceeded the limited facial review that courts normally performed on
an arbitration award. In other words, while Western Electric purported to be
very deferential in its recitation of the standard of review, its actual analysis
explored the merits of the arbitration award—leaving the court free to vacate
the award if it was clearly erroneous. In time, courts allowed this meritsbased sentiment to extend beyond labor arbitration awards.78
70. See Michael H. Leroy & Peter Feuille, Reinventing the Enterprise Wheel: Court
Review of Punitive Awards in Labor and Employment Arbitrations, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
199, 209-10 (2006).
71. 482 F.2d 1012, 1013 (6th Cir. 1973).
72. Id. at 1014.
73. Id. at 1014-15.
74. Id.
75. See W. Elec. Co. v. Commc’n Equip. Workers, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 161, 167 (D. Md.
1976).
76. Id. at 178.
77. See id. at 177-78.
78. CARBONNEAU, supra note 19, at 202.
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D. Acceptance of Manifest Disregard and Public Policy Grounds for Vacatur
In recent years, many circuit courts recognized manifest disregard—first
recognized in Wilko v. Swan, 79 as an additional ground for vacatur.80 In
McCarthy v. Citigroup Global Markets, the First Circuit explained that
“[c]ourts do . . . retain a very limited power to review arbitration awards
outside of section 10.”81 The McCarthy court defined manifest disregard of
the law as a situation “where it is clear from the record that the arbitrator
recognized the applicable law—and then ignored it.”82 In sum, manifest
disregard began to function as a judicial safety valve in situations where the
arbitration award was clearly erroneous as a matter of law.
The labor cases not only recognized manifest disregard as a ground for
vacatur, but also fostered a new attitude regarding enforcement of arbitration
awards.83 Between the 1970s and Hall Street in 2008?, courts were no longer
willing to enforce arbitration awards that were unjust; rather, courts sought to
establish “a floor for judicial review of arbitration awards below which
parties cannot require courts to go, no matter how clear the parties’
intentions.”84 In subsequent decisions, courts began to define the types of
arbitration awards that were unjust and consequently unenforceable.
This change in deference was especially evident when enforcement would
be contrary to public policy. As with other contracts, courts deemed vacatur
proper when enforcement would not promote good public policy.85 This
public policy sentiment was echoed in a line of lower court cases.86 For
example, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to vacate an
arbitrator’s reinstatement of an employee in Misco, Inc. v. United
Paperworkers International Union on public policy grounds.87 In Misco, an
employer terminated an employee, whose job required the operation of
79. Christopher R. Drahozal, Codifying Manifest Disregard, 8 NEV. L.J. 234, 234 (2007).
80. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584-85 (2008).
81. 463 F.3d 87, 91 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Advest v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir.
1990)) (internal citations omitted).
82. Id. (internal citations omitted).
83. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438 (deciding that a balance between arbitration contract
integrity and the rights of individuals to seek redress in the courts should be adjusted to
promote justice).
84. Hoeft v. MVL Grp., Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2003).
85. In W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, International Union of Rubber Workers of
America, the Supreme Court held that a court must not enforce an arbitration award that is
contrary to public policy. 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983).
86. E.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen’s Union, 11 F.3d 1189, 1191 (3d Cir.
1993).
87. See Misco, Inc. v. United Paperworkers Int’l Union, 768 F.2d 739, 743 (5th Cir. 1985).
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dangerous machinery, after discovering the employee in his car smoking
marijuana on his break.88 The Fifth Circuit emphasized the public policy
“against the operation of dangerous machinery by persons under the
influence of drugs or alcohol.”89
The Third Circuit also relied on public policy grounds to vacate an
arbitration award in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seaman’s Union. 90 In
Exxon Shipping Co., an arbitrator reinstated an employee after the employee
was discharged for being intoxicated while on duty.91 The Third Circuit
reasoned that an owner or operator of dangerous equipment should not be
forced to reinstate an employee to a safety-sensitive position when the
employee had been dismissed for being under the influence while on duty.92
However, even in cases in which public policy compelled a court to vacate an
arbitration award, the tension between promoting a national policy favoring
arbitration and judicial infringement “upon the arbitrators’ decisional
sovereignty” was present. 93
While preserving the integrity of the judicial system with judicially created
grounds for vacatur seems logical, commentators fear that incorporating
judicially created grounds for vacatur into FAA arbitration confirmations
“contradicts the gravamen of the legislation and the judicial policy that
underpins it.”94 These commentators believe that adding further grounds for
vacatur will lead to a decrease in arbitration efficiency and predictability—
two of the most important attributes of arbitration.95 The Supreme Court
could have resolved this confusion in Hall Street but declined to do so. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hall Street to resolve the issue of
contractually expanding the standard of review for arbitration agreements

88. Id. at 741.
89. Id. at 743.
90. 11 F.3d at 1191.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1194.
93. CARBONNEAU, supra note 19, at 203.
94. See id.
95. Fine v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 765 F. Supp. 824, 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“[A] court’s
power to vacate an arbitration award must be extremely limited because an overly expansive
judicial review of arbitration awards would undermine the litigation efficiencies which
arbitration seeks to achieve.”); see Martin A. Feigenbaum, Development Bank of Philippines v.
Chemtex Fibers, Inc.: A vote in Favor of International Comity and Commercial Predictability,
21 INT’L LAW. 873, 876 (1987) (“Congress, by passing the [Federal Arbitration] Act, intended
as its principal goal to give predictability to the legitimate expectations of those who agree to
arbitration . . . .”).
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under the FAA.96 The decision in Hall Street left lower courts wondering
what, if anything, was actually resolved.
E. Hall Street v. Mattel
In the wake of uncertainty regarding the availability of judicially created
grounds for vacatur under the FAA, the Supreme Court sought to clear up a
circuit split over whether the parties could contractually expand judicial
review of arbitration awards in Hall Street v. Mattel.97 Hall Street centered
around a landlord-tenant dispute over an indemnification clause.98 The
indemnification clause provided that Mattel, the tenant, would indemnify its
landlord, Hall Street, for the cost that resulted from Mattel’s failure to follow
applicable environmental laws.99 In addition, the lease included a provision
that required the district court to “vacate, modify, or correct any award [if]
the arbitrator's conclusions of law [were] erroneous.”100 Essentially, this
provision provided protection for both parties in the event that an arbitrator
incorrectly applied the law.
In 1998, after high levels of chemical deposits were discovered in the
property’s water well, Mattel agreed to clean up the property.101 In 2001,
Mattel sought to terminate its lease, but Hall Street resisted because it had not
yet been indemnified for the site clean up.102 The matter proceeded to federal
court and, although the court ruled on the issues of lease termination, the
parties agreed to arbitrate the indemnification issue.103 Subsequently, the
arbitrator found in favor of Mattel, reasoning that “no indemnification was
96. Oberwager v. McKechnie Ltd., 351 F. App’x 708, 710 n.4 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hall Street to resolve “a split of authority among the
Circuit Courts of Appeals as to whether parties to agreements subject to the FAA could
supplement by contract the standards for vacatur and modification of arbitration awards set
forth in §§ 9, 10, and 11 of the FAA”).
97. 601 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 2010) (explaining that “manifest disregard of the law is no
longer an ‘independent, non-statutory ground’ for setting aside an arbitration award”) (quoting
Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 358 (5th Cir. 2009); see Comedy Club,
Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1281 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that “manifest
disregard of the law remains a valid ground for vacatur of an arbitration award under § 10(a)(4)
of the Federal Arbitration Act”); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85,
94-96 (2d Cir. 2008) (manifest disregard doctrine is “a judicial gloss on the specific grounds
for vacatur enumerated in section 10 of the FAA”).
98. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 579 (2008).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 579.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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due, because the lease obligation to follow all applicable federal, state, and
local environmental laws did not require compliance with the testing
requirements of the Oregon Drinking Water Quality Act (Oregon Act); that
Act the arbitrator characterized as dealing with human health as distinct from
environmental contamination.”104 Believing the arbitrator incorrectly applied
Oregon law, Hall Street moved to vacate the award; and the district court
vacated the award.105 Upon remand, the arbitrator ruled in favor of Hall
Street, finding that Mattel’s failure to comply with Oregon drinking water
protection laws required Mattel to indemnify Hall Street pursuant to the
indemnification clause.106 Mattel then appealed to the district court and cited
a recently-decided Ninth Circuit opinion holding that contractually modified
grounds for review were unenforceable under the FAA.107 The Ninth Circuit
agreed and ordered the district court to reinstate the original arbitration
award.108 The district court, however, did not reinstate the original award;
instead, the district court ruled in favor of Hall Street and held that the
arbitrator’s lease interpretation was not plausible and exceeded the
arbitrator’s authority under § 10(a)(4) of the FAA.109 After the Ninth Circuit
reversed the decision for a second time, the Supreme Court granted review in
the case to decide whether parties are allowed to extend judicial review under
the FAA by contract.110
The Supreme Court answered in the negative, holding that §§ 10 and 11
respectively outline the “exclusive grounds for expedited vacatur and
modification” under the FAA.111 The Court’s reasoning was simple: the
FAA cannot be read in a way that allows for judicially created exceptions.112
The Court explained, “Instead of fighting the text, it makes more sense to see
the three provisions, §§ 9-11, as substantiating a national policy favoring
arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain arbitration’s
essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.”113 Seemingly concerned
about maintaining the finality of arbitration agreements, the Court continued,
104. Id. at 580.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Serv., 341 F.3d 987, 998 (9th Cir.
2003)).
108. Id. at 581.
109. Id. at 581 n.1.
110. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 196 F. App’x 476 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted
550 U.S. 968 (2007).
111. Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 584.
112. Id. at 588.
113. Id.
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“[a]ny other reading opens the door to the full-bore legal and evidentiary
appeals that can rende[r] informal arbitration merely a prelude to a more
cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process.”114 The Hall
Street decision created confusion among lower courts with regard to
judicially-created exceptions because the scope of the holding was not clearly
defined.115
F. The Aftermath: Interpreting Hall Street v. Mattel
While Hall Street held that parties may not expand the depth of review in
district court by contract, the Court’s rationale also calls into question the
existence of judicially created grounds for vacatur. Consequently, a circuit
split emerged as to the validity of judicially created grounds for vacatur.
Circuit courts confronted with arbitration award confirmation cases have
found application of Hall Street difficult. In Kashner Davidson Securities
Corp. v. Mscisz, the First Circuit Court of Appeals aptly concluded that the
vitality of non-statutory grounds for vacatur under the FAA presents a
difficult issue that courts have only started resolving.116
In one of the first cases following Hall Street, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds International Corporation, the Second Circuit cited Hall Street
for the proposition that excessive interference with arbitration awards would
diminish the utility of arbitration agreements by preventing disputes from
being resolved straightaway.117 However, when the same case reached the
Supreme Court, the Court declined to address the issue: “We do not decide
whether ‘manifest disregard’ survives our decision in Hall Street . . . as an
independent ground for review or as a judicial gloss on the enumerated
grounds for vacatur set forth at 9 U.S.C. § 10.”118 Assuredly, this language
only complicates application of judicially created grounds for vacatur.

114. Id. (quoting Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Serv., 341 F.3d 987, 998 (9th
Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
115.
116. 601 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 2010) (explaining that “manifest disregard of the law is no
longer an ‘independent, non-statutory ground’ for setting aside an arbitration award”) (quoting
Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 358 (5th Cir. 2009); see Comedy Club,
Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1281 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that “manifest
disregard of the law remains a valid ground for vacatur of an arbitration award under § 10(a)(4)
of the Federal Arbitration Act”); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85,
94-96 (2d Cir. 2008) (manifest disregard doctrine is “a judicial gloss on the specific grounds
for vacatur enumerated in section 10 of the FAA”).
117. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 548 F.3d at 92.
118. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767-68 n.3 (2010).
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The Sixth Circuit held that Hall Street does not limit the ability of courts to
vacate a judgment under the FAA in Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C.119
The court interpreted the holding of Hall Street to be limited to instances
where the parties attempt to contractually expand the grounds for vacatur
under the FAA.120 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the “Supreme Court
significantly reduced the ability of federal courts to vacate arbitration awards
for reasons other than those specified in 9 U.S.C. § 10, but it did not foreclose
federal courts’ review for an arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the law.”121
In Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Associates, the Ninth Circuit reached
the same conclusion on alternative grounds. The court incorporated manifest
disregard for the law into the statutory scheme under § 10 (a)(4) of the FAA.
As explained above, this section gives a district court the power to vacate an
award where the arbitrator “exceeded [his] powers” or “so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award . . . was not made.”122
The court reasoned that an arbitrator exceeds his powers when he manifestly
disregards the law.123 Other circuits, however, have moved away from
judicially created grounds for vacatur.
Both the Fifth and Eight Circuits have completely eliminated judicially
created grounds for vacatur.124 In Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v Bacon,
the Fifth Circuit explained, “Hall Street restricts the grounds for vacatur to
those set forth in § 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act.”125 With this single
sentence, the Fifth Circuit eliminated manifest disregard as a valid ground for
vacatur under the FAA.126 The Citigroup court concluded that the practice of
affording substantial deference to arbitration awards is not only consistent
with the FAA but is also consistent with the practices of courts of equity
before the enactment of the FAA.127 Providing only a passing reference to
the circumstances that led to the adoption of non-statutory grounds for

119. See Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 F. App’x 415, 418-19 (6th Cir. 2008).
120. See id. (explaining that the Hall Street court “held that the FAA does not allow private
parties to supplement by contract the FAA’s statutory grounds for vacatur of an arbitration
award”).
121. Id. at 418.
122. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006); see Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d
1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009).
123. See Comedy Club, 553 F.3d at 1290.
124. See Medicine Shoppe Int’l, Inc. v. Turner Invs., Inc., 614 F.3d 485, 489 (8th Cir.
2010); Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 350 (5th Cir. 2009).
125. 562 F.3d at 350.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 350-51.
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vacatur, the Citigroup court concluded that the elimination of non-statutory
grounds for vacatur was not “revolutionary.”128
The Third, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits have yet to address the scope of
Hall Street.129 Because it was not necessary to the disposition of cases, each
court has so far declined to address the scope of Hall Street. In fact, the
Seventh Circuit has not addressed the issue at all. The inconsistencies among
courts leave lower courts and practitioners unsure about the state of judicially
created grounds for vacatur. In 2010, however, the Eleventh Circuit weighed
in on the issue and determined that the Supreme Court’s rationale in Hall
Street eliminated judicially created grounds for vacatur under the FAA.
III. Frazier v. CitiFinancial
A. Facts
In April 2000, John Frazier received a home equity loan from HomeSense
Financial Corporation of Alabama.130 During the course of the transaction,
Mr. Frazier signed a binding arbitration agreement requiring any dispute
arising from the loan to be submitted to arbitration.131 In addition, Mr.
Frazier forged his wife’s signature on the loan agreement.132 The arbitration
agreement specifically provided that the contract would be “governed by the
Federal Arbitration Act.”133 The loan was assigned several times to different
financial services companies and eventually landed in the hands of
CitiFinancial.134 Mr. Frazier used part of the loan to pay existing credit card
balances and other unrelated debts.135 He did not mention the loan to Mrs.
Frazier and had all loan documents sent to his P.O. box in an apparent
attempt to conceal the transaction from his wife.136 Claiming the loan
transaction was fraudulent, Mr. Frazier stopped making loan payments in
November of 2006.137 Shortly thereafter, the Fraziers sought to have the
contract rescinded in state court under the theories of breach of contract,
128. Id. at 350.
129. See Paul Green Sch. of Rock Music Franchising, L.L.C. v. Smith, 389 F. App’x 172
(3d Cir. 2010); Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Bishop, 596 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2010);
Hicks v. Cadle Co., 355 F. App’x 186, 197 (10th Cir. 2009).
130. Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 1314 (11th Cir. 2010).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1316.
134. Id. at 1317.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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fraud, and misrepresentation.138 The Fraziers contended that they believed
the loan given was unsecured.139 After the case was filed in state court,
CitiFinancial removed the case from state court to federal court and moved to
compel arbitration under the agreement.140 Although the Fraziers attempted
to avoid arbitration by contesting the validity of the contract, the district court
granted CitiFinancial’s Motion to Compel Arbitration.141 After a two-day
arbitration, the following decision was reached: (1) “Mrs. Frazier’s signature
on the mortgage had been forged, but Mr. Frazier voluntarily entered into the
secured loan transaction and therefore owed all sums specified in the note”;
and (2) the “TILA, fraud, slander to title, and rescission claims were
unavailing because the Fraziers failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that HomeSense, or the lawyer who conducted the closing, were
agents or associates of CitiFinancial.”142 The arbitrator “awarded $38,706.93
in damages for breach of the promissory note and $9,250.19 in attorneys’
fees.” 143 The arbitrator also attached a lien to the Fraziers’ home for the total
sum of the award.144
B. Procedural History
On September 11, 2008, the district court reviewed and confirmed the
award.145 The court held that the Fraziers could not appeal to an arbitration
panel because their claim did not involve a sufficient amount in
controversy.146 Moreover, the Court concluded that the Fraziers failed to
raise grounds “justifying vacatur and/or modification of the arbitration award
under the FAA . . . .”147 Subsequently, the Fraziers asked the court to
reconsider its previous ruling on the following grounds:
1) the award was subject to vacatur under § 10(a)(4) because the
arbitrator exceeded his authority in granting CitiFinancial an
equitable lien because CitiFinancial did not request such relief;
2) the award was subject to modification and/or correction under
§ 11(b) because in granting CitiFinancial an equitable lien, the
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1318.
Id.
Id. at 1319.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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arbitrator decided a matter not submitted to him; 3) the award
was subject to modification and/or correction under § 11(c)
because the arbitrator’s decision . . . was ‘subject to multiple
interpretations’ and ‘thus imperfect’; 4) [the award should be
vacated under non-statutory, judicially created grounds]; 5) the
Fraziers were entitled to a de novo appeal before a threearbitrator panel; and 6) Mrs. Frazier was not bound by the
arbitration agreement and could not be compelled to arbitrate her
claims.148
The district court refused to vacate the arbitration award and the Fraziers
appealed the decision to the Eleventh Circuit.149
C. Decision of the Case
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision hinged on the grounds available for
vacatur under the FAA and the assumption that FAA created a national
policy favoring arbitration. The court began its analysis by describing the
statutory grounds available under §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA.150 The court then
explained that the district court must affirm the arbitration award unless one
of four statutory grounds for vacatur exists.151
After outlining statutory grounds for vacatur, the court added, “[t]here is a
presumption under the FAA that arbitration awards will be confirmed, and
federal courts should defer to an arbitrator’s decision whenever possible.”152
The court then began to analyze the case using the statutory framework,
concluding that none of the statutory bases for vacatur under the FAA applied
to the Fraziers’ case.153
After concluding no statutory basis for vacatur applied, the court engaged
in a discussion of judicially created grounds for vacatur—specifically
focusing on the manifest disregard and arbitrary and capricious standards and
public policy grounds for vacatur.154 Looking first to precedent from the
Eleventh Circuit, the court noted that these three grounds had been

148. Id. at 1321.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006)).
152. Id. (citing B.L. Harbert Int’l, L.L.C. v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 909 (11th
Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
153. Id. at 1321.
154. Id. at 1322.
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recognized in prior cases.155 In order to determine whether those precedents
had been overruled, however, the court carefully scrutinized Hall Street.
The Eleventh Circuit discussed Hall Street in several different contexts.
First, it acknowledged that Hall Street addressed the issue of “whether the
statutory bases for vacatur of an arbitrator’s award set forth in § 10 may be
supplemented by contract.”156 The Eleventh Circuit noted that in Hall Street,
the Supreme Court answered the question in the negative, holding “that §§ 10
and 11 respectively provide the FAA’s exclusive grounds for expedited
vacatur and modification.”157 Up to this point, the court discussed Hall Street
in the context of contractual expansion of the grounds for review under the
FAA. The court then shifted its focus, however, and interpreted the scope of
Hall Street to encompass a much broader set of circumstances.
The Frazier court interpreted Hall Street as eliminating all judicially
created grounds for vacatur. Quoting Hall Street, the Frazier court
emphasized that the language of the FAA “carries no hint of flexibility” and
that the text of the statute instructs a court “to grant confirmation in all cases,
except when one of the prescribed exceptions applies.”158 The Frazier court
read this language to require the expansion of the holding of Hall Street
beyond contractual expansions of the grounds for vacatur and into the realm
of all judicially created grounds for vacatur under the FAA.159 The Frazier
court reasoned that permitting common law grounds for vacatur would
eventually lead to expansive litigation and defeat the express purpose of the
FAA—expediting the resolution of disputes.160
The Frazier court recognized that Hall Street does not explicitly apply to
judicially created expansions of §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA, but the court cited
a number of other circuits’ interpretations as support for concluding that
judicially created grounds for vacatur cannot survive.161 Even after citing
circuit cases that did not eliminate judicially created grounds for vacatur, the
Frazier court concluded that the categorical language of Hall Street requires
courts to eliminate all such grounds.162

155. Id. (citing B.L. Harbert Int’l, 441 F.3d at 909).
156. Id. (citing Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 578 (2008))
(emphasis omitted).
157. Id. (citing Hall St., 552 U.S. at 584, 587) (internal quotation marks omitted).
158. Id. (quoting Hall St., 552 U.S. at 584, 587) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
159. Id. at 1324.
160. Id. (citing Hall St., 552 U.S. at 584, 587).
161. Id. at 1323.
162. Id. at 1324.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol64/iss2/6

2012]

NOTES

255

The court affirmed the ruling of the district court outright on all of the
propositions of error except for the judicially created grounds for vacatur—
holding that judicially created grounds for vacatur were eliminated by the
Supreme Court in Hall Street.163
IV. Analysis
The Frazier court’s holding was incorrect because it improperly construed
the scope of the Hall Street while ignoring the importance of judicially
created grounds for vacatur to the vitality of the arbitration system. As
explored in more detail below, the Frazier court’s holding was incorrect for
four main reasons. First, the Hall Street decision did not compel the Frazier
court to eliminate judicially created grounds for vacatur. Second, the Frazier
court ignored the importance of judicially created grounds for vacatur as a
mechanism for instilling confidence in the arbitration system and protecting
the public from awards that pose a hazard to public safety. Third, courts may
rely on the contract law doctrines of unconscionability and public policy to
support judicially created ground for vacatur because arbitration agreements
are contracts. Finally, the two policy justifications given by the Frazier court
are unsubstantiated. Specifically, there is no evidence that judicially created
grounds for vacatur significantly affect judicial efficiency. In addition, the
FAA did not create a national policy favoring arbitration justifying the
elimination of judicially created grounds for vacatur. Thus, a bright-line rule
emerged from the Frazier decision, which eliminates the judicially-created
grounds for vacatur, explicitly placing the importance of parties’ freedom of
contract at a higher level than Congress intended when it implemented the
FAA.
A. Non-Statutory Grounds for Vacatur are Important to the Arbitration
System
In order for the FAA to effectively provide an efficient and predictable
alternative to judicial adjudication, the judiciary must retain a check on
arbitrators to ensure that the rights of individuals are protected. While
arbitration remains an effective method for resolving disputes, many cases
have shown the necessity of review in order to protect both individual rights
and public welfare. As discussed above, non-statutory grounds for vacatur
resulted from judicial discomfort with unjust arbitration awards. At the most
basic level, the reasons that non-statutory grounds for vacatur were created

163. Id.
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have not changed: that is, to provide a safety valve in situations where the
interest of justice and public safety necessitates vacating an arbitration award.
1. Judicially Created Grounds for Vacatur are Important to Maintaining
Confidence in the Arbitration System
In a number of cases, the interest of justice requires vacation of an
arbitration award on non-statutory grounds.164 Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc.
provides an example where the interest of justice required vacatur of a
procedurally valid arbitration award.165 There, the Second Circuit vacated an
arbitration award because the arbitrator refused to recognize that an employee
had been discriminated against because of his age—even after an
overwhelming amount of evidence pointing to discrimination had been
presented.166 If the court had failed to step in to vacate the unjust award on
non-statutory grounds, the employee would have had no recourse for his civil
rights violation. Additionally, deferential treatment by the court in such a
circumstance would have sent a signal to arbitrators, businesses, and
individuals alike that arbitrators are not bound by relevant judicial precedent
and may “dispense [their] own brand of industrial justice.”167
Two logical consequences would result from that signal. First, when
arbitration awards are not consistent with established legal norms,
predictability is undermined. It is clear that Congress enacted the FAA to
respond to judicial hostility to arbitration by promoting predictability and
ensuring that arbitration decisions reflect established law.168 This judicial
hostility was based on the idea that arbitrators could not properly apply the
law and make credible decisions.169 If arbitrators can depart from established
law without review, the purpose of the FAA is undermined. Of course, an
unpredictable adjudication system is also undesirable because parties do not
know what to expect and therefore cannot alter their behavior accordingly.
Consequently, parties are likely to simply stop using arbitration agreements

164. See, e.g., Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 128 F.3d 1456 (11th Cir. 1997).
165. 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998).
166. Id. at 204.
167. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596-97
(1960).
168. See Feigenbaum, supra note 92, at 876 (“Congress, by passing the [Federal
Arbitration] Act, intended as its principal goal to give predictability to the legitimate
expectations of those who agree to arbitration . . . .”); see Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148
F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 1998) (“It has been made clear by the Supreme Court, this court and
other courts that the ancient judicial hostility to arbitration is a thing of the past.”).
169. See Leroy & Feuille, supra note 13.
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altogether because the courts, while more expensive, would offer
substantially more predictability.
Second, an arbitration system that does not reflect established legal norms
will be perceived to be unfair. In general, the law reflects established
cumulative norms within our society. Moreover, individuals, even losing
parties, are comfortable with the finality of arbitration only when they are
confident in the system.170 Therefore, deference to arbitrators who ignore
legal norms and rely upon their own sense of fairness frustrates expectations
of society. In addition to the unpredictability of the system, parties will not
want to defer to arbitrators whom they believe to be unfair and from whose
decisions they cannot appeal. A system designed by Congress to offer a more
efficient means of adjudication cannot accomplish its task if it is not used.
Admittedly, most arbitrators will be fair and follow established social and
legal norms. If this were not so, then Congress would not have entrusted
arbitrators with dispute resolution in the first place. However, even a few
examples of unjust arbitration decisions can undermine confidence in the
entire system. As discussed above, Congress did not provide statutory
grounds to set aside all types of unjust awards. Therefore, courts play a
necessary role in maintaining the vitality of the arbitration system by
exercising both statutory and judicially created grounds for vacatur. As
courts universally recognize, this role is rare and deferential; nevertheless, the
Eleventh Circuit’s elimination of judicially created grounds for vacatur opens
the door for an unpredictable and inefficient arbitration system.
2. Judicially Created Grounds for Vacatur are an Important
Comprehensive Public Policy Check on Arbitration Awards
Non-statutory grounds for vacatur are also important to public policy—
including public safety—because an arbitrator’s role is simply to resolve the
dispute presented, not to consider the effects of the decision. Public policy
grounds for vacatur were initially created in response to several cases where
arbitrators reinstated unfit employees to safety-sensitive positions.171 The
most notable of these cases is Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen’s
Union.172 In that case, an arbitrator reinstated an Exxon Shipping employee
after he was discharged for being intoxicated during his regularly scheduled
shift.173 On appeal, the Third Circuit vacated the award in order to advance
170. See Nancy A. Welsh, Disputants' Decision Control in Court-Connected Mediation: A
Hollow Promise Without Procedural Justice, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 179, 180 (2002).
171. See supra Part II.D.
172. 11 F.3d 1189 (3d Cir. 1993).
173. Id. at 1190-91. Remarkably, the incident occurred just six months after an intoxicated
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protection of wildlife, resources, and public safety.174 Although the arbitrator
correctly interpreted the collective bargaining agreement, it was incumbent
upon the court to consider the interest of society as a whole.
The increase in arbitration agreements makes it extremely important that
courts have the ability to vacate arbitration awards when the award is
contrary to prevailing public policy. As a general matter, courts have always
considered the public policy effects of their decisions, especially with regard
to public safety.175 In Exxon Shipping Co., the arbitrator considered only the
dispute; however, a holistic approach must be taken in order to prevent
arbitration awards from contradicting sound public policy. The Eleventh
Circuit’s elimination of the public policy ground for vacatur diminishes the
ability of a federal court to vacate an arbitration award that is contrary to
public policy. If arbitration awards contrary to public policy are confirmed,
the court’s role in promoting good public policy will be subverted.
The court’s role in promoting sound public policy goes beyond the
resolution of a single dispute and into the theories behind our governmental
institutions. While a discussion of the purpose of the judicial system is
beyond the scope of this article, it is widely accepted that the judicial branch
should aspire to make common-law rules that advance the public good. In
fact, much of the judicial branch’s early hostility toward arbitration was
based on the idea that it was too mechanical and unable to take into account
the effects a decision may have on society as a whole.176 If courts are unable
to vacate arbitration awards based on public policy concerns, the early fears
of the judicial branch will be realized and there will be no comprehensive
check on arbitration awards.
3. Congressional Intent is Best Served by the Preservation of NonStatutory Grounds for Vacatur
It is also reasonable to conclude that Congress has intended for public
policy reasons for vacatur of arbitration awards to survive. Non-statutory
grounds for vacatur have been in use for over fifty years.177 During that time,

ship captain ran the Exxon Valdez, an oil tanker bound for California, into the Bligh Reef off
Prince Williams Sound, Alaska. Id. at 1194. The accident was an environmental disaster
which raised awareness about the culture of shipping industry employees and alcoholism.
174. Id. at 1196.
175. See Stewart E. Sterk, Commentary, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An
Examination of the Public Policy Defense, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 481, 482 (1981).
176. Harry T. Edwards, Commentary, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or
Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 679 (1986).
177. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953).
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there have been no attempts by Congress to amend § 10 of the FAA and
declare the statutory grounds listed as the exclusive grounds for vacatur.178 In
fact, Congress has amended the FAA five times since enacting the FAA in
1925—amending § 10 as recently as 1990.179 Additionally, it is hard to
imagine that Congress intended the likely dangerous and unjust results that
would have been reached in Exxon Shipping Co. and Halligan in the absence
of non-statutory grounds for vacatur. Congress did not intend a system that
would endanger the public or allow patently unjust results; therefore, the
preservation and exercise of non-statutory grounds for vacatur best serve
congressional intent.
At a time when docket control complicates judicial efficiency, arbitration
proves an invaluable asset.180 Like other areas of law, including contract law,
arbitration must be subject to control beyond the will of the parties or the
judgment of arbitrators. Arbitration requires judicial safety valves in order to
avoid awards that undermine justice and public safety.181
B. Contract Law as a Model for Judicial Safeguards
Arbitration is a creature of contract law; thus some similar themes exist.182
Judicially created safeguards in arbitration mirror judicially created grounds
for contract avoidance. The law of contracts includes a number of judicially
created reasons to prohibit the enforcement of contracts, including public
policy and unconscionability.183 Just as the FAA is a provision that governs
the enforcement of arbitration awards, the law of contracts is an elaborate
framework designed to enforce contractual agreements.184 Although caveat
178. Thomas E. Carbonneau, "Arbitracide": The Story of Anti-Arbitration Sentiment in
the U.S. Congress, 18 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 233, 278 (2007) (“Title 9, U.S.C. §§ 1-14, was
first enacted Feb. 12, 1925 (43 Stat. 883), codified July 30, 1947 (61 Stat. 669), and
amended September 3, 1954 (68 Stat. 1233). Chapter 2 was added July 31, 1970 (84 Stat.
692). Two new sections, both initially denominated 15 and later corrected to 15 and 16, were
passed by the U.S. Congress in October 1988. The renumbering took place on December 1,
1990 (Pub. L. Nos. 669 and 702); Chapter 3 was added on August 15, 1990 (Pub. L. Nos.
101-369); and § 10 was amended on November 15, 1990.”).
179. Id.
180. See Harry T. Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived “Bureaucracy” of the
Federal Courts: A Causation-Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68
IOWA L. REV. 871, 930-36 (1983).
181. See supra Part IV.A.2.
182. See, e.g., E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin
Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2001).
183. CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 585,
632 (6th ed. 2007).
184. See generally id.
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emptor is a theme that is present in the law of contracts,185 courts have
routinely carved out exceptions in the enforcement of contracts in order to
protect the parties from the dangers involved with unfettered contract
enforcement.186 At the start of the twentieth century, courts developed
common law exceptions to the general rule of caveat emptor.187 In many
situations, contracts seemed unfair as written, even though all of the parties
agreed to the contractual terms and there were no procedural deficiencies in
the contract formation.188 These unfair contracts made courts uncomfortable
enforcing the substantive terms of otherwise valid contracts—leading to the
creation of common-law exceptions to contract enforcement.189 In sum,
courts were uncomfortable with blind enforcement of the provisions of
contracts merely because parties agreed to those provisions.
Since “arbitration is a creature of contract,” the law of contracts should
govern it.190 Judicial discomfort with enforcement of unjust contracts is
analogous to the discomfort courts experienced with the enforcement of
unjust arbitration awards prior to the recognition of judicially created grounds
for vacatur. Because the law of contracts recognizes judicially created
safeguards designed to avoid the enforcement of unjust contracts, freedom of
contract does not justify the Frazier court’s express repudiation of the
judicially created grounds for vacatur. The lack of logical policy justification
for the elimination of judicially created grounds is particularly troubling
given the limited scope of Hall Street.
C. Hall Street Should be Read Narrowly
1. Frazier and Hall Street are Factually Distinguishable
The Frazier court incorrectly applied Hall Street to the case because the
facts and issues in Frazier were not analogous to those in Hall Street. The
Frazier court was specifically faced with the issue of whether judicially
created grounds for vacatur were available to the Fraziers. The Fraziers
alleged that the district court erred when it refused to vacate their award in
185. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (Danaher, J., dissenting).
186. See generally KNAPP ET AL., supra note 183, at 585.
187. See, e.g., Williams, 350 F.2d at 450; Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773 (Wash.
2004); Higgins v. Superior Court of L.A. Cnty., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 293, 300-01 (Ct. App. 2006).
188. See E. Allan Farnsworth, CONTRACTS § 4.28, 298-99 (4th ed. 2004).
189. KNAPP ET AL., supra note 183, at 585, 632.
190. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates, S.A.S.,
269 F.3d 187, 194-95 (3d Cir. 2001).
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part because “the arbitrator’s decision was contrary to public policy and
[was] made in manifest disregard of the law.”191 The Fraziers failed to raise
any proposition of error alleging a contractually expanded review, nor does
the record indicate that the parties contracted to expand the scope of review
under the FAA.192 Thus, Frazier can be factually and legally distinguished
from Hall Street because Hall Street involved the contractual expansion of
the grounds for vacatur under the FAA.193 Nevertheless, this distinction can
be overcome if Hall Street can be interpreted broadly enough to cover all
grounds for vacatur under the FAA. But it cannot.
2. The Intended Scope of Hall Street
As the Supreme Court is the ultimate interpreter of the law, the meaning of
Hall Street is essential in determining if judicially created grounds for vacatur
exist under the FAA.194 If Hall Street expressly limited the grounds for
vacatur under the FAA to §§ 9 and 10, then the circuit courts of appeal would
have no choice but to follow precedent and declare judicially created grounds
for vacatur void.195 However, if Hall Street applied only to the contractual
expansion of the grounds for review under the FAA, then it would not apply
to Frazier. In order to determine whether the Eleventh Circuit’s holding was
based on binding precedent, the scope of the Hall Street holding must be
explored.
The Hall Street opinion did not expressly eliminate judicially created
grounds for vacatur.196 The holding in Hall Street was directed at the
contracting parties’ ability to contractually expand the depth of review
provided by a federal court.197 The basic and fundamental question addressed
by the Court was whether parties may contractually expand the standard of
review beyond what is provided for by the FAA.198 The Court answered this
question negatively, holding that §§ 9 and 10 are the exclusive grounds for
191. Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir. 2010).
192. Id. at 1320-21.
193. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008).
194. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
195. See Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1485 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Where prior panel
precedent conflicts with a subsequent Supreme Court decision, we follow the Supreme Court
decision.”) (citing Lufkin v. McCallum, 956 F.2d 1104, 1107 (11th Cir. 1992)).
196. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767-68 n.3 (2010);
Hall St., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008).
197. Hall St., 552 U.S. at 581 (“We granted certiorari to decide whether the grounds for
vacatur and modification provided by §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA are exclusive.”).
198. Id.
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vacatur under the FAA.199 Next, the Court engaged in a discussion of
judicially created grounds for review in the context of contractually expanded
grounds for vacatur—above and beyond the statutorily created grounds in the
FAA.200 However, the Court’s discussion was limited to contractual
expansion of the grounds for review.201 The Court discussed manifest
disregard by citing the petitioner’s contention that “if judges can add grounds
to vacate (or modify), so can contracting parties.”202 This language makes it
clear that the Court was specifically referring to a party’s right to
contractually expand the level of review, not to the non-statutory grounds for
vacatur.
As noted previously, Stolt-Nielsen suggests that the Court did not intend to
address the issue of judicially created grounds for vacatur when it decided
Hall Street.203 The Court explicitly stated, “We do not decide whether
‘manifest disregard’ survives our decision in Hall Street . . . as an
independent ground for review or as a judicial gloss on the enumerated
grounds for vacatur set forth at 9 U.S.C. § 10.”204 Therefore, the issue is left
to the circuits because the Supreme Court has confirmed that it has not
spoken on that issue.205 Because Hall Street did not eliminate the judicially
created grounds for vacatur, the Circuit Courts are free to decide these issues
considering the law in their circuit and policy rationale.
Because Hall Street does not apply to the judicially created grounds for
vacatur addressed in Frazier, the Eleventh Circuit should have instead looked
to circuit precedent. Prior decisions of the Eleventh Circuit unequivocally
recognized judicially created grounds for vacatur under the FAA.206 Even the
Frazier court acknowledged the existence of non-statutory grounds for
vacatur.207 Citing B.L. Harbert International, the Frazier court recognized a
199. Id. at 576.
200. Id. at 584-85.
201. Robert Ellis, Recent Developments, Imperfect Minimalism: Unanswered Questions in
Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008), 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 1187, 1191-92 (2009). See John S. Baker IV, Recent Developments, Hall Street
Associates v. Mattel, Inc.: What are the Exclusive Grounds for Modifying an Arbitration
Award Under the Federal Arbitration Act?, 32 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 207, 207, 212 (2008).
202. Hall St., 552 U.S. at 585.
203. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767-68 n.3 (2010).
204. Id.
205. See United States v. Holloway, 499 F.3d 114, 118 (1st Cir. 2007).
206. See B.L. Harbert Int’l, L.L.C. v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 910 (11th Cir.
2006); Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 128 F.3d 1456 (11th Cir. 1997); O.R. Sec., Inc. v.
Prof’l Planning Assocs., 857 F.2d 742 (11th Cir. 1988).
207. Frazier v. CitiFinancial, 604 F.3d 1313, 1322 (11th Cir. 2010).
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long history that supported the use of judicially created grounds for vacatur in
the Eleventh Circuit.208 Therefore, circuit law opposes Frazier, leaving only
policy justifications as a rationale for departure from prior jurisprudence.
D. The Eleventh Circuit’s Policy Rationale is Misplaced
The Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Frazier was not a product of stare
decisis; rather, the holding was based on flawed policy justifications. One of
the most valuable assets that reviewing courts have is their ability to consider
the changing effects of the rule of law.209 Ignoring the misinterpretation of
Hall Street by the Eleventh Circuit—concluding that Hall Street mandated
the elimination of non-statutory grounds for vacatur—it is possible that the
Frazier court saw the Hall Street opinion as a call to reconsider the
usefulness of judicially created grounds for vacatur. In order to properly
analyze the merits of the decision, the policy rationale cited by the Frazier
court must be examined. The court relied on the policy goals of judicial
efficiency and arbitration award finality. The court discussed these issues
through the lens of Hall Street and cited the Supreme Court’s opinion.210
1. Non-Statutory Grounds for Vacatur Do Not Undermine Judicial
Efficiency
The Frazier court’s judicial efficiency and arbitration award finality
justification has merit on its face because both of these values are important
to the effectiveness of the arbitration system under the FAA. The court
recognized the need for arbitration awards to be final.211 If arbitration awards
can simply be appealed to the federal district court and receive a full merits
hearing, then the purpose of arbitration is frustrated because there would be
little chance for parties to avoid litigation.212 It was logical for the Frazier
court to protect the finality of awards; however, most commentators were
satisfied with the finality of arbitration awards even with the availability of

208. Id. (citing B.L. Harbert Int’l, 441 F.3d at 910).
209. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
210. Frazier, 604 F.3d at 1322 (citing Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576,
588 (2008)).
211. Id.; see also U.S. Postal Serv. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 204 F.3d 523, 527 (4th
Cir. 2000); Eljer Mfg., Inc. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir. 1994)
(observing that “a restrictive standard of review is necessary to . . . prevent arbitration from
becoming a ‘preliminary step to judicial resolution’”) (citing E.I. DuPont de Nemours v.
Grasselli Emps. Indep. Ass’n, 790 F.2d 611, 614 (7th Cir. 1986)).
212. U.S. Postal Serv., 204 F.3d at 527.
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judicially created grounds for vacatur so long as the standard for setting aside
the awards remained stringent.213
The need to protect finality of arbitration awards is not sufficient to justify
eliminating judicially created grounds for vacatur. A study conducted in
2006 revealed that arbitration awards are confirmed at a rate of ninety percent
in federal courts across the United States.214 The study also found that among
all arbitration awards vacated, in both state and federal court, only four
percent can be attributed to non-statutory grounds for vacatur.215 This can be
explained by the significant burden that must be met in order to meet the
prima facie case for non-statutory vacatur.216 The rigid standards and low
success rates associated with petitions for vacatur on non-statutory grounds
provide evidence that the existence of these grounds does not undermine the
goal of judicial efficiency.
2. Illusory Policy: There Is No National Policy Favoring Arbitration
Since many courts and commentators believe the primary point of the
FAA and the “national policy favoring arbitration” is to avoid timeconsuming, expensive, merits adjudications, it is not completely irrational to
explore the possibility that eliminating judicially created grounds for vacatur
would be a sensible way of promoting judicial efficiency.217 However, there
is some debate about the underlying value that drives such strict adherence to
arbitration awards—“the national policy favoring arbitration.”218
In support of its holding, the Frazier court reasoned there is a “national
policy favoring arbitration.”219 Therefore, it is important to explore the notion
213. See Lawrence R. Mills et al., Vacating Arbitration Awards, 11 DISP. RESOL. MAG.,
Summer 2005, at 23, 25 (finding that manifest disregard was only successful four percent of the
time it was argued, while arbitration awards are confirmed ninety percent of the time in federal
court); see also Eric D. Dunlap, Setting Aside Arbitration Awards and the Manifest Disregard
of the Law Standard, 80 FLA. B.J., July-Aug. 2006, at 51.
214. Mills, supra note 213, at 25.
215. Id.
216. See Dunlap, supra note 213, at 51.
217. KESSLER, supra note 27, at 85-86.
218. Compare Steven Walt, Decision By Division: The Contractarian Structure of
Commercial Arbitration, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 369 (1999) (arguing that the national policy
favoring arbitration is really a policy favoring freedom of contract), with William R. Casto, The
Steelworkers Trilogy as Rules of Decision Applicable by Analogy to Public Sector Collective
Bargaining Agreements: The Tennessee Valley Authority Paradigm, 26 B.C. L. REV. 1, 14-15
(1984) (arguing that it was the intent of Congress to encourage parties to use arbitration to
resolve their disputes, as opposed to the courts).
219. Frazier v. CitiFinancial, 604 F.3d 1313, 1322 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Read together,
sections 9-11 ‘substantiat[e] a national policy favoring arbitration with just the limited review
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that the FAA created a policy that favors arbitration. This notion originated in
the dicta of early arbitration cases, but is nowhere in the FAA.220 The FAA
does not, implicitly or explicitly, declare a national policy favoring
arbitration; instead, the FAA simply provides a framework for enforcing
arbitration awards.221 In addition, the legislative history reveals that the plain
focus of the FAA at the time of passage was to make arbitration awards
enforceable in federal courts by statutorily eliminating a common law
doctrine that disfavored arbitration.222 This distinction is subtle, but if the
courts are going to eliminate judicially created grounds for vacatur on the
basis that the FAA’s policy requires the courts to favor arbitration, then it is
important to question that assumption.
Many courts have challenged the existence of a national policy favoring
arbitration.223 Instead of viewing the FAA as a statement by Congress in
favor of arbitration, those courts focus on the elimination of judicial hostility
toward arbitration.224 In Gotham Holdings, LP v. Health Grades, Inc., the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals explained that there is no national policy
favoring arbitration.225 In reality, the FAA acts as a mechanism to eliminate
judicial hostility towards arbitration agreements.226 Although the Supreme
Court’s language in Hall Street suggests that there is in fact a national policy
favoring arbitration, more recent opinions by the Court call that assumption

needed to maintain arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.’”)(internal
citations omitted).
220. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-14 (1984) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1
(1924))(exploring the legislative history of the FAA making it clear that Congress’s intent in
passing the FAA was simply “to place ‘[a]n arbitration agreement . . . upon the same footing as
other contracts, where it belongs.”).
221. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006).
222. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (“The purpose of this bill is to make valid and enforceable
agreements for arbitration contained in contracts involving interstate commerce or within the
jurisdiction or admiralty, or which may be subject to litigation in the Federal courts . . . [t]he
need for the law arises from . . . the jealousy of the English courts for their own
jurisdiction . . . . This jealousy survived for so lon[g] a period that the principle became firmly
embedded in the English common law and was adopted with it by the American courts. The
courts have felt that the precedent was too strongly fixed to be overturned without legislative
enactment . . . .”).
223. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476
(1989); Gotham Holdings, LP v. Health Grades, Inc., 580 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 2009); see
also Arthur Andersen, L.L.P. v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009).
224. Gotham Holdings, 580 F.3d at 666.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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into question.227 In Arthur Andersen, LLP v. Carlisle, the Court clarified
federal policy by explaining that the goal of the FAA is “to place [arbitration]
agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.”228 Even in recent
Supreme Court cases, such as AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, which
boldly tout the national policy favoring arbitration, the explanation of what
the national policy favoring arbitration means contradicted the very idea that
arbitration is favored. 229 In Concepcion, the Court explained that the federal
policy favoring arbitration simply means “courts must place arbitration
agreements on equal footing with other contracts, and enforce them
according to their terms.” 230 In sum, the national policy favoring contract
enforcement includes arbitration contracts. The federal policy toward
arbitration is equal treatment and enforcement of arbitration contracts, not
promotion of arbitration. As explained in Gotham Holdings, parties do not
violate or undermine the integrity and utility of arbitration by litigating
instead of arbitrating.231 The absence of a national policy favoring arbitration
undermines the primary policy justification advanced by the Frazier court for
eliminating non-statutory grounds for vacatur.
V. Conclusion
The validity of non-statutory grounds for vacatur under the FAA is
important to the vitality of the arbitration system. If arbitration agreements
are given nearly unfettered deference by the courts, the result will
undoubtedly be unjust arbitration awards and the erosion of confidence in the
arbitration system. The Frazier decision places the arbitration system at risk
by relying on the limited scope of Hall Street and flawed policy justifications
to support its holding. Hall Street applies only to circumstances where
parties have contractually expanded the grounds for vacatur, not as a mandate
for the elimination of judicially created grounds for vacatur. The policies
underlying the Frazier decision are also flawed because of two
227. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 577 (2008); AT&T Mobility
L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745-46 (2011).
228. Arthur Andersen, 129 S. Ct. at 1901 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., 489 U.S. at 478) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
229. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1745-46 (2011) (“We have described this provision as
reflecting both a ‘liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,’ and the ‘fundamental principle
that arbitration is a matter of contract.’ In line with these principles, courts must place
arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts, and enforce them according to
their terms.”) (internal citations omitted).
230. Id. (emphasis added).
231. 580 F.3d at 666.
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fundamentally erroneous assumptions: (1) non-statutory grounds for vacatur
undermine judicial efficiency and (2) the FAA enacted a national policy
favoring arbitration. Both of these assumptions are incorrect. While finality
is an important value, it cannot be advanced at the expense of ensuring that
arbitration awards are just and do not violate public policy. Instead, the same
approach taken with regard to contracts should be maintained in the
arbitration system—courts should have safety valves in order to avoid
confirmation of unjust awards. Just as these safety valves have not
undermined freedom of contract, evidence suggests they do not undermine
the arbitration system. Therefore, non-statutory grounds for vacatur under
the FAA should be maintained in order to ensure that courts have a legal
basis for vacating arbitrary arbitration awards.
Sean C. Wagner
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